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Security in depth · Unit 28 · Lesson 4 of 11

A trust boundary is not a network line

Distinguish an authenticated relay from authority to approve a business decision.

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Helpful before thisThreat modeling: ask before building

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  • Identify a trust boundary when applicant-supplied information becomes an approval claim.

One idea. One situation. One reasoned decision.

Follow authority, not geography

A trust boundary marks a change in which claims a component may accept and what authority they carry. Components on the same host can have different purposes and permissions. Drawing separate boxes does not itself enforce that distinction; the receiving component needs an appropriate decision.

Incoming claim → Changed trust assumption → Required decisionIncoming claimChanged trust assumptionRequired decision
Track the origin and authority of a claim even when every component shares a host.

Read the supplied record

T1 describes a fictional club membership service.

Component or fact Supplied role
Applicant Supplies form answers, including a claimed approval label
Intake relay Validates format and forwards applications
Approval service Records decisions from authorized reviewers
Deployment Relay and approval service share a host
Receiving check Relay identity is authenticated

Assume the relay forwarded the form accurately and has authority only to submit applications. The applicant’s label remains a claim from the applicant. Authenticating the relay establishes a sender, not an authorized review decision.

The approval service should use its trusted reviewer decision record to determine approval. Format validation can establish that a field is understandable; it cannot establish who was entitled to decide its value.

Your diagram should mark the transition from submission data to approval state and name the evidence required there. An approved reviewer decision for the relevant application supports the transition; a copied label alone does not.

This record identifies a necessary design boundary, not proof that an incorrect approval occurred. Moving one component to another machine would not settle the authority question either. Review the actual identity, permitted operation, and source of each decision.

The key distinction: Knowing the messenger does not establish the authority of every message field.

Check yourself

No timer. No penalties. Read the explanation and try again whenever you like.

  1. What may the approval service conclude from T1’s authenticated relay identity?

    Show the answer

    Correct answer: The request came from the relay, but an applicant-supplied approval label is not an authorized approval. The relay is authorized to forward applications. Its authenticated identity does not turn applicant-controlled content into the reviewer’s decision.

Try it

  • WriteDraw three labeled boxes for T1: applicant, intake relay, and approval service. Mark who supplies each claim, which component may approve membership, and the evidence required at that transition.
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